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I
MARKETING PRACTICES PRIOR TO THE RISE OF TRUSTS AND MERGERS
A. The F.O.B. Practice
In the American economy open markets for the basic commodities developed both
as voluntary centralizations of private dealers and as formally organized commodity
exchanges. By i86o the principal central markets for iron, steel, and the non-ferrous
metals were located in New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Chicago, and St. Louis. The task of distributing the metals was largely performed
by dealers and jobbers (independent wholesale merchants) who maintained ware-
house facilities in the central markets and also on land adjacent to the producing
mills. These trade interests purchased commodities from nearby mills or from
sources abroad for resale to consuming industries. The products purchased were
either shipped directly from the producing mills to the fabricators or placed in
storage to await the development of consumer buying.
Merchants and speculators in the central markets performed the useful service
of accumulating inventories, at a time when consumer demands were declining, for
sale again when business conditions improved. This activity, known as the "balance
wheel" function, helped to provide a broad and continuous market for first hand
producers and also helped to prevent sharp price declines when the consuming in-
dustries were not buying. Thereupon, when the demands of consuming industries
revived, the accumulated stocks of merchants and speculators served as a counter-
balance to check extreme price advances.
The usual practice followed by various trade interests in the sale of the basic
commodities was to quote prices f.o.b. their warehouses in the central markets or
f.o.b. the mill if direct delivery was made.1 If delivered prices were quoted, they
were determined by taking the seller's f.o.b. mill or warehouse price and adding the
actual freight from the shipping mill to the various destination points. In the
* B.B.A. 1928, M.B.A. x929, University of Washington; Ph.D. 1932, Princeton University. Professor
of Economics, University of Washington. Author, OPEN MARKETS: AN ESSENTIAL OF FREE ENTERPRISE
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1 See, for example, the trade papers of the period, as well as 2 V. S. C. ARK, HISTORY OF MANUFAc-
TUE 1S THE UNITED STATES 288 (x929). F.o.b. mill pricing means free on board, that is, loaded on cars
or trucks at the seller's mill or warehouse with all charges paid up to that point but not including
insurance or freight beyond. An f.o.b. price is the price at the freight yard of the origin of shipment.
C.i.f. pricing differs from f.o.b. mill pricing in that a c.i.f. price is a composite price which covers pay-
ment for three separate items: (i) the f.o.b. mill price or cost, (2) the actual insurance cost, and (3)
the actual freight cost to a particular destination. A c.i.f. price always means a landed price at the
destination point.
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Pittsburgh-Plus case, Henry P. Bope, an executive in the American Steel Corporation,
testified that in the steel industry the general practice as late as 188o was to quote
prices f.o.b. the mills. "Each mill," he added, "was a law unto itself."2
The f.o.b. mill prices of a given seller were also usually uniform to all buyers at
the mill or warehouse at a given time. Trade journals and the newspapers pro-
vided a considerable amount of price publicity, and the very number of independent
dealers, with supplies on hand in the central markets or in storage at or near the
producing mills, usually made it impossible for a seller to make some buyers pay
more than the "going" price to others. It is true that a locally separate mill some-
times charged nearby buyers more than it received on shipments to buyers in a
central market.3 All of the available evidence, however, indicates that this exercise
of local monopoly power was an exceptional practice and not the rule. The general
pattern was one of f.o.b. mill pricing in which prices in the local markets and at
points of production were less than in the central markets and at destination points
by the actual cost of freight and handling charges.
B. The Growth of Discriminatory Pricing
The rapid extension of rail lines around i86o, and the rise of towns and con-
suming points along the main transportation routes made it possible to build larger
mills and smelters and to expand greatly the areas of practical shipment. Geograph-
ically separate mills, moreover, gradually learned by experience that profits could
be enhanced by making direct sales to local buyers at high prices while cutting prices
on sales in other areas to match or undercut the quotations of distant rivals. Under
such conditions, f.o.b. mill pricing in certain basic industries began to give way to
various forms of discriminatory pricing. In order to avoid the evils of local price
cutting and also to enhance their profits, a number of regional groups turned to the
formation of "pools," "associations," and "loose-knit combinations" through which
prices were fixed by agreement.
Monopoly agreements had frequently been made in earlier years by local groups
of producers. Such agreements, it appears, were based upon the charging of iden-
tical f.o.b. mill prices. When geographically separate mills, however, sought to act
as one on price, there at once developed the problem of how all of them could
quote identical prices at the important consuming points because geographic location
gave certain mills a freight advantage over others. If each locally separate mill had
adopted an identical f.o.b. mill price, those nearest to the consuming centers would
have secured a major share of the business. The iron bar industry, consisting of a
number of geographically separate producers, wrestled with this problem as early
as 1875. According to the American Manufacturer for May 1I, 1875, "The meeting
of the Western Iron Association last week was a most important one and was largely
'Federal Trade Comm'n v. United States Steel Corp., Docket No. 760, 2 Statement ol Case 639
(1924).
'J. M. SWANK, THE MANUFACTURE OF IRON IN ALL AcS 188 (1892), quoting ISRAEL ACRELIUS, A
HISTORY OF NEw SWEDEN 169 (874).
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attended.... It was ... agreed to require each firm in this association to deposit a
specified sum of money . . . to be used as a forfeit, in case the depositing firm is
detected in cutting rates. The equalizing of railroad freights is in the hands of a
committee who as yet have made no report." (Italics supplied.)
The trade journals of 1875 to i88o indicate that several groups of locally separate
steel mills seeking to avoid price competition experimented with various plans of
zone prices and freight equalization. In i88o the four manufacturers of steel beams
(the Carnegie Company in Pittsburgh and three others in Eastern Pennsylvania and
New Jersey) formed an association for fixing prices and established Pittsburgh as
the common base for quoting prices This agreement on the part of the locally
separate steel beam producers to quote the Pittsburgh price plus the rail freight
from Pittsburgh to destination, regardless of the actual origin of shipments or the
actual freight cost incurred, appears to have been the first use of the basing point
system in the United States.
In 1894 the manufacturers of nails adopted the Pittsburgh-Plus formula for the
pricing of their product. According to a report of the Federal Trade Commission,
"Early prices [for nails] were made mill prices, but as the business developed, manu-
facturers of wire and cut nails based quotations on the price f.o.b. Pittsburgh, either
in carload or less than carload lots. That price at all other points was the same,
with freight from Pittsburgh added."5
Pools, associations, and "loose-knit" combinations provided an effective means
for avoiding price competition as long as business conditions were good. When
demand began to decline, however, small and financially weak producers usually
"broke away" and reduced their prices in order to find a selling outlet for their
products0 When the price agreements collapsed, competition typically became ruth-
less and cutthroat. The larger concerns, especially, cut prices sharply in areas of
active competition in an effort to coerce or discipline firms showing a price inde-
pendence. Such price cutting proved to be highly chaotic because the larger con-
cerns could usually make up some or all of their losses elsewhere. The depression
of 1896-1897, it is reported, led to a collapse of all of the various pools and price
associations, and the resulting price rivalries became particularly severe and
demoralizing.
The weakness of pools, associations, and other forms of concerted action based
upon agreement led business leaders and their legal counsel to search for more
effective methods of price control. The trust device proved to be an effective method
for controlling competitors and avoiding price competition, but its use was chal-
lenged and subsequently condemned in the state courts as a monopolistic measure.
The revolutionary action taken by New Jersey in 1889 in providing that corporations
' Federal Trade Comm'n v. United States Steel Corporation, Docket No. 760, 2 Statement of Case
638-639 (1924).
a id. at 262-263. Additional data on the early use of the basing point system may be found in
THE BAsNG POINT PROBLEM 107-I08 (TNEC Monograph 42, x941).
a 13 REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COmMIssION 501-502 (o901).
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chartered there could own and vote the stock of other corporations appeared to pro-
vide an effective substitute for the trust device, although the enactment of the
Sherman Act in 189o raised doubts about the legality of this arrangement. These
doubts, however, were largely dispelled by the Supreme Court in the Sugar Trust
case,' in which it was held that the Sherman Act could not be applied to a monop-
olistic combination of sugar refineries on the ground that manufacturing was distinct
from commerce and that a combination of manufacturing plants had only an "indi-
rect" effect upon commerce. Upon the basis of this decision, which the Court
subsequently overruled, the way became clear for large business interests to form
corporations to acquire a permanent and absolute ownership interest in scores of
formerly independent and competing plants.
II
MERGERS AND THE FURTHER USE OF GEOGRAPHIC PRICE DISCRIMINATION
A. Cutthroat Competition
Most of the new combinations (mergers) formed during the period x897-1903,
it appears, employed some form of geographic price discrimination in their pricing
policies. In a number of cases, particularly in oil, tobacco, sugar, salt, copper, lead,
iron, and steel, the combinations employed "local price cutting" in one area while
maintaining prices elsewhere, expressly to injure or kill off a geographically separate
competitor. This practice became known as "cutthroat competition." In 190o the
United States Industrial Commission, after an extensive investigation of the methods
of competition employed by the combinations, concluded that perhaps the "greatest
evil" of combinations was to be found in the fact that they "cut prices to an unrea-
sonable extent in certain localities, and even to individuals at certain times, for the
sake of driving out their rivals."'
The shocking use of local price cutting of the cutthroat variety was vividly re-
vealed in the evidence presented in the Standard Oil' and American Tobacco' °
cases decided by the Supreme Court in i911. Upon the basis of this and other evi-
dence, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported in 1914 as follows :11
In the past it has been a most common practice of great and powerful combinations
engaged in commerce-notably the Standard Oil Co., and the American Tobacco Co.,
and others of less notoriety, but of great influence-to lower prices of their commodities,
oftentimes below the cost of production in certain communities and sections where they
had competition, with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their
competitors, and with the ultimate purpose in view of thereby acquiring a monopoly in
the particular locality or section in which the discriminating price is made.
Every concern that engages in this evil practice must of necessity recoup its losses in
the particular communities or sections where their commodities are sold below cost or
TUnited States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
a I REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 20 (1900).
2 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, :22 U. S. 1 (x91x).
"United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. Io6 (191z).
H. R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (914).
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without a fair profit by raising the price of this same class of commodities above their
fair market value in other sections or communities.
Such a system or practice is so manifestly unfair and unjust, not only to competitors
who are directly injured thereby but to the general public, that your committee is strongly
of the opinion that the present antitrust laws ought to be supplemented by making this
particular form of discrimination a specific offense under the law when practiced by those
engaged in commerce.
B. Sporadic or Anarchic Discrimination
Some of the combinations were less ruthless in their pricing practices and
adopted a moderate sort of discriminatory pricing "to meet competition." Products
were usually sold f.o.b. the shipping mill, but at certain points in distant areas
prices were cut to match or undercut somewhat the prices of a geographically separate
rival. Various combinations found that a limited form of local price cutting was
a profitable practice because it enabled them to avoid reducing prices in their
area of freight advantage while "reaching out" to sell in distant regions. They
also found that the practice was an advantageous method for checking the growth
of distant rivals. When new competitors developed at certain points, delivered
prices could be cut in those areas to prevent the rivals from becoming bigger and
stronger competitors. This method of pricing appears to have been used by a num-
ber of combinations prior to the formal adoption of a policy of cooperative, systematic
price discrimination.
Discriminatory price cutting to limit a competitor rather than to annihilate him
has become known as "sporadic" or "anarchic" discrimination. The purpose of a
dominant seller in employing this form of geographic price discrimination is largely
opportunistic-that is, to charge high prices where competition is weak or non-
existent and to reduce delivered prices where rivals are active. The practice is
unsystematic and anarchic, and discrimination is exercised in accordance with no
principle except the ambiguous one of "meeting competition." A small producer
can never be sure about the delivered price quotations which he is likely to find in
his local area or the extent to which they may be cut.
C. Cooperative, Systematic Price Discrimination
The problem of formulating a price and sales policy for a considerable number
of geographically separate mills in the iron and steel industry was squarely faced in
i9oI by those in charge of the newly formed United States Steel Corporation-the
largest and most extensive of the early mergers. If the Corporation had adopted
identical f.o.b. mill prices at its separate mills, the unequal freight costs to consuming
centers would have given certain mills a substantial sales advantage over others. The
desire of the Corporation was to eliminate price competition among its constituent
plants and at the same time permit considerable local autonomy in their manage-
ment. Some method, therefore, had to be found for equalizing the element of
freight. In discussing the adoption of the Pittsburgh-Plus system by the Corporation
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for use by its locally separate plants, Charles M. Schwab testified in 19ol, "I don't
see any other plan of doing it; you must establish some central point."'
The problem which a central financial unit has in unifying the sales policies of
its constituent companies has been noted by a number of economic and legal authori-
ties. Walter B. Wooden, a long-time student of basing point pricing, explains the
situation as follows: "The full advantages of chain production are dependent upon
the chain's maintenance of a system of pricing that reduces undue conflict between
its own plants variously located. Such conflict would arise if the buyers were per-
mitted to get their goods at a lower cost from one plant of the chain than from
another. To permit that creates a tendency toward price competition among mem-
bers of the family group that was established to avoid it."' 3
A further policy question before the Corporation was that of its relations with
the remaining independents in the steel industry. There is abundant evidence to
indicate that if one of the concerns in a sales area is a local enterprise while the
other is a chain producer, geographic price discrimination tends to produce either
(i) a condition of monopolistic exclusion or (2) a condition of cooperative, monop-
olistic pricing based upon conspiracy or price leadership and price following. If a
local seller quotes a low price in his area of freight advantage, the multiple-plant
company may retaliate and quote a lower discriminatory delivered price; and the
resulting price cutting in that area may thereupon become cutthroat. The dominant
concern is usually in a position to make up its losses elsewhere while the single-
plant firm has no such opportunity. Inevitably, the local concern is faced with the
prospect of being slowly or rapidly driven out of business or compelled to follow
the price leadership of its more powerful rival. Historical records indicate that the
Steel Corporation decided upon a monopoly policy of including its competitors rather
than the usual one of excluding them, provided that they would follow its price
leadership.
Thus it was that the regular and consistent use of the basing point formula by
the United States Steel Corporation served the purposes (i) of insuring the quota-
tion of identical prices by all mills-its own mills as well as independents-and (2)
of avoiding the geographic and automatic allocation of sales which identical f.o.b.
mill pricing would create. The prices announced by the Corporation at Pittsburgh
became the "official" prices, and all producers quoted the Pittsburgh base prices plus
the rail freight from Pittsburgh to the point of delivery regardless of their own
individual location or the actual freight cost incurred.'
An interesting account of the establishment of the basing point system of deliv-
22 13 lEPORr oF Ta INDUS'ruAL CoMUsssON 469 (igoi).
"Wooden, The Defense of Delivered Price Systems, x5 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 31 (946).
"A detailed record of the part played by the United States Steel Corporation in establishing the use
of the basing point system for the sale of all steel products except rails may be found in Federal Trade
Comm'n v. United States Steel Corporation, Docket No. 760, Statement of Case, Brief and Argument
by Attorneys for the Federal Trade Commission, and Trial Examiner's Report on the Facts (1924).
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ered prices in the sale of bars and plates is contained in the following report written
in igoi by a trade correspondent in Philadelphia:
Early in the year it looked as though there might be a somewhat demoralized market
for bars and plates, but this was fortunately avoided by the manufacturers of each of
these specialties formulating plans for maintaining uniform prices, which have proved to
be eminently successful. It took a good deal of time to arrive at a basis which would be
satisfactory to all the various interests, one great difficulty being in the variety of con-
ditions in regard to location of mill, proximity to markets, cost of production, etc. The
plan finally adopted and which has worked perfectly so far, and which is likely to be
continued indefinitely, was to base all quotations at a figure agreed upon for f.o.b. de-
liveries in Pittsburgh. The local mills (Philadelphia) therefore quote Pittsburgh prices-
plus freights to whatever point the material has to be shipped. . . . The same plan is
in force among the plate mills, although it is less binding than that in bars. The plate
mills have a verbal agreement, and the bar mills have a written agreement which is
further strengthened by a substantial cash deposit. The lowest prices during the year
were $1.35 for bars and $1.40 for plates, but under the price agreement they are now
$1.62 and $1.72, and likely to remain at that for an indefinite period.
Shortly after the general adoption of the basing point plan in the iron and steel
industry in igoI, the practice was extended to the cement industry.'6 Thereafter,
the plan had little vogue until around 1912 when its use became widespread. Prod-
ucts, in addition to iron and steel, which came to be sold on a single basing point
plan were cast-iron soil pipe, glucose, malt, maple flooring, welded chain, zinc, lead
(St. Louis plus freight differentials), and copper ("Connecticut Valley" plus freight
differentials). Certain industries adopted a multiple basing point system in which
two or more basing points were established by industry leaders for pricing purposes.
Representative products which came to be sold on a multiple basing point plan were
cement, iron and steel (after 1924), hardwood lumber, gasoline, sugar, chemical
fertilizers, milk and ice cream cans, asphalt roofing materials, linseed oil, rigid steel
conduit, fire brick, lubricating oil, and plate glass.
III
TiH BASING POINT FORMULA
A. A Form of Cooperative, Systematic Price Discrimination
The essence of the basing point formula (in contrast with f.o.b. mill pricing)
is the sale of goods at delivered prices which are determined by quoting the base
price of some other mill plus freight from that mill to destination. In so far as a
mill quotes its own mill price, uniform to all customers, it is engaging in f.o.b. mill
pricing. Basing point pricing comes into existence when geographically separate
"
5 THE PMLADELPHIA IRON MARKET FOR 19OI, ANNUAL REviEw OF THE NEw YORK METAL EXCHANGE
3 (1902).
"'FTC, PRIcE BAsEs INQUIRY: THE BASING POINT FORMULA AND CEMENT PRICES 29-41 (1932). In
1948 the Supreme Court held that the Federal Trade Commission was fully justified in finding "under-
standing expressed or implied" in the establishment and use of the multiple basing point system in the
cement industry. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 716 (1948).
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mills quote delivered prices for any destination by adding to an established base
price at a given point, called the basing point, the freight charge-usually rail
freight-from that point to the point of delivery, regardless of the actual origin of
shipments or the actual freight cost incurred. As a general rule, it may be said
that the selection of a base price is made by a price leader (a dominant corporate
merger) . 7  The base price or prices so established are thereupon accepted (with
rare exceptions) by all other mills for making sales in the contiguous territory.
The various mills in a basing point industry may employ one or more bases
for the entire country, and in some industries every mill may serve as the base mill
for its contiguous territory. The practice of charging a customer the freight cost
which he would pay in getting delivery from a nearer supplier rather than the seller's
actual transportation cost, is known as freight equalization. In a plan of freight
equalization every mill is usually regarded as a base.
The price relationships which arise in multiple basing point selling are illustrated
in Fig. i. A, B, and C, it may be assumed, are sugar mills selling in their own
localities, as well as in the principal consuming center of B. A and B are base mills,
and C is a non-base mill. Under the multiple basing point system each seller quotes
MILL A 75 MILL C
Base Price Delivered Cost
$8 per Unit $8.75 per Unit
o/ so/
MILL B
Base Price
$8 per Unit
Pio. 3. The multiple basing point system of delivered prices. All mills regularly quote the par-
ticular "base price" plus freight from the basing point to the customer's location which gives the lowest
combination of base price and freight cost. The essence of the basing point plan is the use of the base
price and freight of some other mill.
a delivered price which is the lowest combination of a base price at any base mill
plus the rail freight from that mill to a particular destination. Thus all buyers at C
are given an identical delivered price quotation of $8.75 per unit. Mill C, it may
be noted, charges its local customers a freight item of 75 cents per unit which it does
not pay out in making delivery. This fictitious charge is known as "phantom
freight." Phantom freight may be defined as the excess of the freight item charged
the buyer over the freight actually paid out by the seller in making delivery. The
"justification" which business interests usually give for phantom freight is the asser-
"' Brief for Respondents, Vol. I, App. A, pp. 474-476; Federal Trade Comm'n v. The Cement Insti-
tute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
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tion that the price of $8.75 per unit is the price which a buyer at C would have
had to pay for sugar if someone had not chosen to build a factory at C.
On sales in B all buyers are given an identical delivered price quotation of $8.oo
per unit. This pricing practice means that mills A and C have their mill net prices
reduced 50 cents and 8o cents respectively by "freight absorption." Freight absorption
is defined as the excess of the actual freight paid in making delivery over the amount
of the freight item used in calculating the delivered price.
The absorption of variable amounts of freight on current sales (as well as the
charging of variable amounts of phantom freight) results in variable mill net prices.
In the Staley cases price discrimination was considered by the Supreme Court to
be the making of a difference in the net amount charged to different buyers by any
seller. This view of discrimination is in accord with the concept of discrimination
employed in economic analysis. The price discrimination involved in the basing
point system was said by the Court to be regular and systematic. The discrimina-
tion is regular and systematic because (i) all geographically separate mills regularly
quote the delivered price of the appropriate base mill and (2) they absorb (or add)
just enough freight (no more and no less) to match the base price plus the rail
freight from the basing point to the customer's location.
B. The Exclusion of Independent Merchants and Distributors
The adoption of basing point pricing has involved the use of two additional
restrictive sales methods. A consideration of these factors, unfortunately, has largely
been overlooked in current discussions of the basing point problem. The first is the
concerted practice of basing point mills to refuse to sell to independent merchants
and distributors. In their efforts to manage prices the large combinations soon found
that supplies in the hands of middlemen and dealers directly limited their power to
raise prices as consuming demands increased. Independent merchants typically
accumulated large inventories of basic commodities-such as pig iron, merchant bars,
copper, lead, and zinc-during periods of low prices and slack demand, for sale
when fabricating industries resumed their buying. This activity helped to maintain
an even state of employment and production. The combinations, however, found
that the presence of accumulated supplies in independent hands not only limited
their ability to get higher prices during a period of business expansion, but also
provided a source of competition over which they had no control.
In order to eliminate the troublesome competition of independent distributors,
all of the large steel producers soon after igoI opened their own district sales offices
and assumed an almost complete control over the distribution of their iron and steel
products. Local jobbers were permitted to stock a few products-such as horseshoes,
nails, galvanized sheets, and fencing-for local sale and usually at prices higher than
the delivered carload rate. Such jobbers, however, were sold only a few carloads
at a time, and speculative buying was not permitted.
's Federal Trade Comm'n v. A. E. Staley Mfg. CO., 324 U. S. 746, 751 (1945).
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The combinations in the non-ferrous metals industry similarly sought to
strengthen their use of basing point pricing by adopting the policy of selling only to
consumers (fabricators). Soon after i9oi the lead combination adopted the policy
of selling refined and common pig lead only to consumers, and in quantities which
it believed they should purchase. This industry policy has been continued to date.
The primary producers of copper likewise adopted a general policy of refusing to
sell to dealers or speculators. Their declared reasons for this policy are (I) to dis-
courage trading on the commodity exchanges and (2) to prevent dealers from
acquiring supplies for sale again when consumer demands are rising 9 In a pro-
gram of stabilizing zinc prices, the major zinc producers in 1928 established East
St. Louis as the basing point for Prime Western slab zinc and uniformly restricted
sales of zinc to consumers °
In the development of the cement industry the usual marketing policy was one
of selling through distributors and other wholesale middlemen at f.o.b. mill prices.
A witness for the industry in the recent Cement case, for example, stated, "In the
early days of the distributor relationship the sales were at f.o.b. mill prices. The
commitments from the distributors to ourselves were definite commitments and the
distributor was at perfect liberty and did sell as he could, for whatever measure of
profit he could get."21 The elimination of the independent merchants in the cement
industry, and the discontinuance of making all sales f.o.b. the mill took place in
various regions from 19o2 to i9122 As in the case of iron, steel, and the non-ferrous
metals, the elimination of the cement merchants by a combination or industry group
occurred quite abruptly. An industry witness in the Cement case, for example,
testified, "We eliminated most of them at the end of i9o2."2
The results of "fencing in" the demand for iron and steel, the non-ferrous metals,
and many other basic commodities have been more far reaching than is generally
realized. Merchants and speculators bought supplies when consumer demand was
declining and sold them again when business improved. This activity helped to
provide first-hand producers with a continuous market and also served to stabilize
prices. In restricting the sale of their products to fabricators, processors, and local
jobbers, the large combinations have created a condition in which there is little, if
any, current demand whenever the consuming industries are not buying. The de-
mands of consuming industries, moreover, are usually quite irregular, for they reflect
the variable demands of ultimate consumers and the general state of business. By
"fencing in" the demands for their products, basing point industries have accentuated
the problem of providing sustained employment and production.
"' Hearings before Temporary National Economic Committee on P. Res. 153, Pt. 25, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 13244-13245 (1940).
20 V.NON A. MuND, OPEN MARKETS 199-201 (948).
21 Brief for Appellants, Vol. I, App. A, p. xos, The Cement Institute v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 144
F. 2d 22X (C. C. A. 7th 1945).
'2-d. at 104-11.
2 11d. at iii.
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In 1899 the tin-plate workers of Pittsburgh called attention to the serious impact
on employment of the newly established policy oqf the tin-plate combination to restrict
sales to consuming buyers of its own choice. According to the union, "When the
trade was in the hands of independent firms, large quantities of ware were manu-
factured into stock against future calls or sold at very small profits to large buyers
who stocked it in their own warehouses against the brisk season; thus the workmen
were given employment throughout the slack winter months. But the trust, having
complete control of the trade, will neither incur the cost of storage on its own
premises nor abate its ironclad prices so that the buyers may lay up a stock for
future trade."2
C. Price Management and the Curbing of Production
A second restrictive policy which the large combinations adopted in conjunction
with basing point pricing was that of producing only those quantities which could
be sold at the managed prices. The general practice of independent mills prior to
the formation of monopolistic mergers was to produce continuously, in good times
and bad, for sale to a variety of trade interests-merchants, speculators, fabricators,
and industrial users. When the level of business activity declined, it was the in-
efficient, poorly located mills which discontinued their operations. At no time, it
appears, was there a general curtailment of production by all mills-efficient and
inefficient. With the formation of mergers, however, the production of all mills was
typically curbed to prevent an accumulation of supplies and a "breaking" of prices.
The large combinations could and did sharply restrict the output of their own mills,
and the remaining independents soon adopted a similar policy. Since the established
plan was one of refusing to sell to nonconsuming interests, a producing mill either
had to find customers at the "official" prices or store its products in its own ware-
houses. Most mills did not-and do not-have large storage facilities. The practical
alternative, therefore, became one of restricting output and employment rather than
of producing for inventory.
The hearings of the Federal Trade Commission on basing point pricing in the
cement industry showed clearly that the limited storage facilities possessed by first-
hand producers are a barrier to continuous employment. Industry members repeat-
edly stated that the storage facilities of most plants are insufficient for continuous
production.25
IV
THE FREIGHT ALLOWED OR ZoNE DELIVERED PRICING SYSTEM
A. History and Operation
A second type or form of delivered pricing is the "freight allowed" or "zone
delivered" method of price quotation. When this method of pricing is used jointly
i REPORT OP THE INDuSTRIAL CoiMMssIoN 905 (1903).
s Brief for Appellants, Vol. I, App. A, p. 79, The Cement Institute v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 144
F. 2d 221 (C. C. A. 7th 1945).
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by two or more sellers (either by agreement or by price following), it also results in
identical delivered prices and an avoidance of price competition.
The first use of the freight allowed method of pricing appears to have come with
the formation of the American Tobacco Company in 189o. During the period 189o
to i9oo the plan was extended to the sale of such products as water meters, wire rope,
retail scales, meat slicers, and meat choppers. From 1900 to 1904 pipe tools, vises,
pipe cutters, auger bits, wood boring tools, screw drivers, and machine knives were
priced "freight allowed." From 19o8 to 1912 the practice was adopted by manufac-
turers of automobile tires, tire chains, brake lining, various chemical products, and
electric lamps. Many additional industries adopted freight allowed methods of sell-
ing during the National Recovery Administration (i933-1935), and new applications
have been made up to the present time.
In using the freight allowed method of pricing, a seller quotes a base or zone
price containing an average freight item and thereupon "allows" the freight from
his mill to destination. The goods may be sent prepaid or the buyer may be directed
to pay the freight and deduct it from the invoice cost before remitting payment.
In certain cases, the practice is for a seller (or industry group) to establish a national
uniform delivered price applicable to any established freight station in the United
States. This is the basis on which the Post Office Department carries the mail. In
other cases the country is divided into two or more geographical areas or zones,
and a uniform delivered price (including a transportation increment averaged for
the zone) is quoted for each zone.
A classification of the various methods of selling products "freight allowed" may
be made as follows :"
i. Goods sold at one list or base price for the entire country with a full allowance of
freight to any established freight station. A minimum shipment may or may not be
specified. Examples of products sold by this method include-
Arc Welding Machines Aluminum Products (500-1,000 lbs.)
Tire Chains (24 pairs) High-grade Zinc
Brake Lining (zoo lbs.) Mechanical Rubber Goods (zoo lbs.)
Multi-blade Fans, Blowers, and Air Washers Leather Transmission Belting (zoo lbs.)
Household Electrical Appliances Steam Condensors (traps)
Files and Rasps (150 lbs.) Sheet Metal Fittings ($20o)
Machine Knives Asbestos Products
Rubber soled Canvas Footwear (zoo lbs.) Water Meters (iso lbs.)
Lubricated Plug Valves (500 lbs.) V-Drive Pulleys and Belts (zoo lbs.)
Steel Split Pulleys Pneumatic Tools and Hoists
Copper Wire (insulated or plain), Cable, Sheets, Stillson Pipe Wrenches (2oo lbs.)
and Tubing (200 lbs.) Air Compressor Hose (500 ft.)
Brass and Bronze Wire or Cable (200 lbs.) Rubber and Fabric Transmission Belting (zoo
Mechanics' Hand Tools lbs.)
Flexible Steel and Aluminum Conduit (zoo lbs.) Chain Hoists (Hand operated), Trolleys, and
Bakelite Winches (zoo lbs.)
Rubber Fuel Tanks Marine Specialties and Ship Fixtures (zoo lbs.)
Rubber Cement Soft Drinks
"0 The examples of products sold at zone delivered prices are from a survey made by the writer in
1949. This survey was undertaken for a forthcoming book, Government and Business, to be published
in the spring of 195o.
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2. Products sold at one list or base price for the entire country with "freight allowed
and prepaid" to any established freight station. Representative products sold by this
method include-
Cadmium
Industrial Motors and Controllers
Electric Lamps (standard packages)
Biologicals, Arsenicals, Insulin, and other drug
specialties
Coated Abrasives (2oo lbs.)
Rubber Covered Building Wire
Cable Accessories and Magnet Wire (too lbs.)
Dictating Machines and Accessories
Typewriters
Glazier Tools (ioo lbs.)
Groceries; Trade-marked items-such as soap,
canned soup, shortening, cereals, cake flour,
and canned dog food (r carload)
Automobile Tires and Tubes (2oo lbs.)
Cash Registers, Accounting Machines, Adding
Machines, and Check Writing Machines.
Notions-such as zippers, buttons, pins (Variable
minimums)
Cotton Thread (too lbs.)
Cigarettes and Tobacco Products
Candy Bars (zoo lbs.)
3. Products sold to dealers and industrial users with "freight allowed" or "allowed and
prepaid" within zones. Representative products include-
Arc Welding Electrodes (too lbs.) Lubricating Oil, Grease, and Kerosene Dispensing
Hard Fiber Twine Equipment
Insulating Board Products Hydraulic Lifts (Gasoline Station)
Water Works Valves Sash Pulleys (soo lbs.)
Scales, Meat Choppers, Slicers, and Coffee Mills Folding Chairs and School Chairs
Power Cable Chain, Sprockets, Gears, and Power Transmission
Street Lighting Equipment, Reactors, Feeder Machinery (soo lbs.)
Regulators (soo lbs.) Wire Rope (200 lbs.)
Distribution Transformers Liquid Chlorine
Portable Air Compressors Feed Water Heaters
Portable Elevators Cross Cut Saws and Handles, Hack Saw Blades
Glass Containers and Frames, Hand Saws, and Saw Tools (soo
Brass and Copper Strip (too lbs.) lbs.)
Paint Lye
Screws, Nuts, Bolts Hand Lift Trucks
Electric Grinders Paper Bags
Gasoline Service Station Pumps Water Softeners
4. Products sold to local jobbers and distributors with freight allowed to designated dis-
tribution points. Representative products include-
Portable Electric Tools (soo lbs.) Dry Cell Batteries and Flashlights (2oo lbs.)
Various Chemical Products Pliers, Wrenches, and Small Tools (too lbs.)
Air Rifle Shot (2oo lbs.) Rock Drills (too lbs.)
Oil Cans, Oilers, Fillers, and Torches Auger Bits, Wood Boring Tools, and Screw Driv-
Electric Fans (too lbs.) ers ($too)
Plumbing Fixtures (carload lots) Manila Rope (200 lbs.)
Ammunition Road Machinery
Kraft Paper and Kraft Container Board Ladders
Firearms (too lbs.) Brass and Copper Products
B. Reasons for the Use of the Freight Allowed Policy
The freight allowed method of price quotation may be used independently and
individually by a given seller for any one of a number of reasons. Some sellers
report that they desire to have a uniform national retail price for advertising purposes
and at the same time give their variously located retailers the same delivered cost.
This is accomplished by including an average freight item in the quoted price. Other
manufacturers report that they desire to place their wholesale distributors in ad-
joining territories on "an equal competitive basis." Some firms state that they employ
a zone pricing system in order to secure lower delivered costs on sales into distant
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areas. By averaging the freight item, the seller can hold delivered costs in other
areas to a lower level.
Although zone delivered pricing methods may be used independently, the evi-
dence indicates that they are often employed by an entire industry group. With
the systematic practice of full freight allowance and with identical factory (or base)
prices, the plan serves as an effective method for securing identical delivered prices.
Each locally separate seller simply adopts the base or zone price announced by the
dominant seller or sellers with the proviso "freight allowed" or "freight allowed
and prepaid," and all buyers at a given destination point are thereupon given the
same quotation. (See Fig. 2.)
$i.oo Freight
0 0
MILL A MILL B
Base or Zone Price $2o Base or Zone Price $2o
(Freight Allowed) (Freight Allowed)
FIo. 2. The freight allowed or zone delivered system of pricing. Each seller following the formula
adopts an identical base or zone price (containing an average freight item) and "allows" the freight
from his mill to the destination. Buyers at all destination points, accordingly, are given the same price
quotation.
V
PRACTICES USED BY DOMINANT SELLERS TO SECURE THE OBSERVANCE OF
DELIVERED PRICING FORMULAS
During periods of declining demand, independent mills (usually single plant
competitors) are frequently tempted to deviate from the use of delivered pricing
formulas on sales in certain areas or to certain customers in an effort to secure an
outlet for their products. There is abundant evidence to show that the price leader
(or leaders) usually takes immediate steps to correct this situation. One method
used is to talk with the recalcitrant mill about the dangers of sporadic and cutthroat
discrimination. The general counsel for the United States Steel Corporation, for
example, has advised his client that "The harmful effects of cutthroat competition,
of unfair trade methods, of selling below cost or even a fair margin of profit, and
the like, are legitimate subjects of discussion. ' 7 The fear of discriminatory pricing
practiced by large concerns is still a powerful motive which serves to secure and
maintain compliance.
A common method employed by industry leaders to maintain the observance of
basing point systems is that of imposing a "punitive base price" on the competing
mill which is equal to the lowest mill net price received by the competing mill. In
using this technique, a price leader quotes a low base price in the area of the rival
" Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, Pt. 20, 7 6th Cong., 2d Sess. 10994
(1939).
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mill to govern al sales made in that area. This practice means that the low price
made by the rival mill for a few sales will prevail on all local sales.28
Another practice employed by an industry leader to secure compliance with de-
livered pricing systems is that of "price raiding." Price raiding means the "cutting"
of delivered prices in particular local areas, or to particular customers, usually in a
discriminatory way, expressly to injure the concern showing a price independence.
The resulting price chaos is known as a "price war." The power of a dominant
concern to cut prices to extremely low levels is based either upon financial strength
or upon the existence of monopoly power in certain areas in which the losses may
be recouped 9
The privilege of using discriminatory pricing methods (especially sporadic geo-
graphic discrimination) gives industry leaders a powerful weapon of coercion and
discipline for securing unity of action on price. A further factor accounting for
unity of action is the extra profits which all sellers may secure through an avoidance
of price competition. As a result of the factors of fear and favor, every follower
acts in a restrained manner as if he were forbidden to reduce the delivered prices
required by the industry formula. Upon the basis of this consistent mutuality of
behavior, various economists, the Federal Trade Commission, and the courts have
concluded that the collective or parallel use of basing point or zone delivered pricing
systems involves either agreement or a mutual restraint on individual action with
illegal trade restraining effects.
VI
DELIVERED PRICING SYSTEMS AND INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION
Basing point and zone delivered pricing systems operate not only to eliminate
price competition, but also to prevent a decentralization of industry. The use of an
eastern base price makes for high cost-prices in the West and South and discourages
the development of local fabricating industries. Local fabricators which do develop,
moreover, cannot ship eastward to any significant extent in competition with fabri-
cators located near an eastern basing point, because the delivered costs of their basic
supplies are higher.
When basic products (such as aluminum) are produced in the West and South
and sold "freight allowed," the development of local fabricators is likewise restricted.
Local prices are high-as high as elsewhere in the country-and fabricators find no
cost advantage in building plants near the sources of supply. The sale of fabricated
products (such as copper wire, cable, and tubing) by eastern mills at freight allowed
prices (based upon an average freight item) also serves to discourage the develop-
"5 Data on the use of punitive base prices to discipline industry members showing a price independence
may be found in Brief for Appellees, Vol. I, App. A, pp. 495, 499, 504-505, Federal Trade Comm'n v.
The Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
"' Corwin D. Edwards cites the case of a large producer in the building materials industry which
has carried a cash reserve of over so million dollars for use as a "war chest" to discipline rivals who
reduce prices below levels which the company regards as satisfactory. EnwARDs, MmAINTI5NwO Cozaa-
=ioN xo_9-io (1949).
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ment of distant fabricators, for the established mills, in effect, are able to "dump"
into the distant areas by absorbing some or all of the freight-at the expense of their
nearby customers.
VII
SOME CONCLUSIONS ON TEE USE OF BASING POINT AND ZONE DELIVERED
PRICING SYSTEMS
Historical data show that with the rise of markets in the American economy,
industrial and agricultural products were typically sold at f.o.b. prices. Subsequently,
with the rise of mergers, basing point and zone delivered pricing systems were in-
creasingly adopted by multiple-plant producers in order (I) to insure identical
delivered prices and (2) to avoid the automatic allocation of sales which f.o.b. mill
pricing would involve. In general, independent producers were given the oppor-
tunity of following the leader on price. A policy of price following was usually
adopted in order (i) to secure extra profits or (2) to eliminate the instability of
sporadic discrimination. Delivered pricing systems were widely adopted during the
period of the National Recovery Administration when the application of the anti-
trust laws was suspended.
Basing point and zone delivered pricing systems are only two of several special
devices of restriction employed by monopolistic groups. Other important and con-
comitant devices are (I) the concerted refusal of organized producers to sell to inde-
pendent dealers and distributors and (2) the curbing of production to those quantities
which can be sold at the managed prices.
Basing point and zone delivered pricing systems work an injury to buyers because
(i) they force some buyers to pay an overcharge for freight; (2) they deny all buy-
ers the privilege of arranging for the purchase of their own transportation; and (3)
they usually result in an elimination of independent price competition.
Local price cutting-cutthroat and sporadic-is a principal means by which domi-
nant firms coerce, injure, and discipline geographically separate independents. At
the present time, the use of cutthroat competition has largely been replaced by that
of sporadic or anarchic discrimination practiced to limit a competitor rather than
to destroy him.
Spokesmen for big business frequently attempt to justify sporadic price discrimi-
nation by declaring that this method of pricing promotes competition. In absorbing
all or a part of the freight charges, it is said, sellers can acquire business in distant
markets and buyers are'given a wider choice of sellers. The fact is, however, that
sporadic discrimination is only a limited kind of competition-restricted to certain
areas. It is not the kind of competition found in open markets.
Experience has shown, moreover, that sporadic discrimination usually works to
the disadvantage of small, single-plant competitors. When a small business firm is
getting established in a particular area, it frequently finds that it must offer its goods
at prices somewhat below those of a large rival. Its prestige and reputation are not
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firmly established, and some inducement must be offered to secure customers. If
a large distant concern is permitted to match the local prices by reducing its mill
net prices on sales in that area, the small rival may have little opportunity of ever
developing its business.
Neither economists nor lawyers have thus far been able to develop a workable
rule or standard for use in permitting the exercise of freight absorption, except by
reference to the exclusion of competitors. Where can the line be drawn between
legitimate and illegitimate degrees of geographic price discrimination? Must an
efficient producer wait for relief until he has been forced into bankruptcy? If a
mill shrinks its mill net to ship into a distant area and regularly matches the price
which it finds, it is following a plan of systematic price discrimination. This is the
monopolistic basing point practice. On the other hand, if a mill quotes a discrim-
inatory delivered price which is below that of a rival in the distant area, it is a
case of local price cutting which Section 2 of the Clayton Act was expressly designed
to prevent.
There is no logical basis for legalizing price discrimination which is exercised
"in good faith to meet competition." As applied to geographic price discrimination,
the term "meeting competition" means the cutting of net prices to buyers in a cer-
tain area while maintaining them on sales made in other areas. Meeting competi-
tion, in this sense, is the very act of discrimination. In real markets (local, central,
or primary), sellers do not "meet competition" by engaging in price discrimination.
The phrase "in good faith to meet competition" has no established or generally
accepted economic or legal meaning. A consideration of "motives" is a task for
mind readers and clairvoyants rather than for administrative agencies and the courts.
All business is done for commercial advantage; and the task of supervising a policy
of legalized geographic price discrimination would impose an exceedingly difficult
burden upon the antitrust agencies.
An important reason for going further in the direction of required f.o.b. mill
pricing is to try to get behavior which is like that found in competitive markets.
With the collective use of basing point and zone delivered pricing systems, sellers
do not have a motive-a competitive pressure or compulsion-to reduce base prices
in order to provide a selling outlet for their capacity. When business begins to
decline, a basing point or freight allowed practitioner reaches out for customers by
absorbing larger amounts of freight. The extent to which he reduces his mill net
by absorbing freight depends upon how "hungry" he is for business. As a result
of this practice, a seller secures lower net prices on a part of his sales, but delivered
prices to buyers are usually not reduced. An abolition of freight absorption would
do much to correct this situation. Locally separate mills would be provided with
a genuine motive to reduce their base prices in order to sell in distant consuming
areas, and the resulting price flexibility would insure a more rapid adaptation of
the economy to changes in the conditions of demand and supply.
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F.o.b. mill pricing is only a partial remedy for the problems of geographic price
discrimination and identical delivered pricing, for the factors of collusion, conspiracy,
and monopolistic mergers still remain. If the substance of the problem of indus-
trial monopoly in the United States is to be reached, consideration must be given
to centralized financial control and corporate concentration °
See, particularly, the remedies proposed by Corwin D. Edwards, id. at 133-155.
